Submission to the Special Rapporteur on summary and arbitrary executions: the murder of 13 civilians by soldiers of The British Army on 'Bloody Sunday', 30th January 1972

The 13 people who died on Bloody Sunday (a fourteenth person was to die later)were taking part in an illegal demonstration against internment without trial. A crack battalion of the British Army, the 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment (the Paras), reputed to be the toughest regiment in the army, was deployed to mount an arrest operation within the Bogside area of city of Derry, which had been a nationalist "no go area" for British troops for the previous two years. The Paras opened fire on the demonstrators, a small number of whom had previously been engaged in low-level rioting, such as stoning soldiers. Accounts differ as to whether the soldiers were fired upon before opening fire or whether they fired without provocation, but it is undisputed that army statements issued after the incident claiming that the deceased were gunmen and bombers were untrue. There is no evidence that any of the deceased was engaged in attacking soldiers at the time of their deaths; on the contrary most of them were fleeing from the soldiers. No soldier was prosecuted for any of the killings. The British government ordered an immediate judicial inquiry into the incident, undertaken by the Lord Chief Justice, "Lord" Widgery. His report, published in April 1972 less than three months after the event, has been criticised and discredited in a number of important respects. So far, pleas from the relatives of the deceased for a new inquiry to establish the true facts and to properly exonerate the reputations of the deceased have been denied by the British government.

Key Points Concerning Bloody Sunday

The following summary has been abstracted from our full report, copies of which are available on request. The numbers in square brackets refer to paragraph numbers in the full report, which contains greater detail.

1. The deceased were taking part in an illegal demonstration against internment without trial [2.2], against a backgound of extreme political unrest and violence on the part of the security forces [section 2].
2. The local police Chief Superintendent wanted to take a low-key approach to the march, but he was over-ruled by the army with Cabinet approval [3.2].
3. The Paras, a crack operational army regiment, were deployed to carry out what was officially described as an arrest operation [3.3]. The Paras were trained to shoot to kill [3.5]. Individual soldiers among the Paras were briefed to expect armed resistance to their presence at the demonstration [3.4].
4. Accounts differ as to whether the Paras were the first to open fire or whether they were fired upon first [section 4]. However, the Paras' evidence to the Widgery Inquiry that they came under a hail of acid-, petrol- and nail- bombs is unsustainable, while not one of those killed or wounded on Bloody Sunday was proved to have been handling any weapon or bomb at the time [4.5].
5. Nevertheless, government spokesmen and the Ministry of Defence issued statements immediately after Bloody Sunday describing the deceased as gunmen and bombers. Lord Widgery also found that there was "strong suspicion" that some of the deceased had been firing guns or handling bombs at some point that afternoon. [section 5]
6. The only one of the deceased said to have been found in a possession of any weapon was Gerald Donaghy, aged 17, whose body was photographed with nail bombs in his pockets. It is obvious from all the evidence that these bombs were planted on the body after his death [6.1].
7. All of the deceased were killed by well-aimed shots. Some of them were shot more than once while lying helpless on the ground. Others were fleeing from the soldiers at the time of their death. [section 6]
8. The British government paid compensation for the deaths to the relatives of all of the deceased [6.15].
9. Thirteen others were wounded on Bloody Sunday [section 7]. None of them was charged with any offence arising out of the demonstration [7.12].

Key Points concerning the Wigdery Inquiry

1. Although on the face of it the appointment of the Lord Chief Justice to carry out the inquiry suggested good faith on the part of the Heath government, "Lord" Widgery was perceived as a member of the establishment [8.2.2] and the government ignored calls from many quarters to set up a wider tribunal [8.2.3].
2. The inquiry sat at Coleraine, a mainly Protestant town, rather than Derry, where Bloody Sunday occurred [8.3].
3. "Lord" Widgery reported less than three months after Bloody Sunday. Although at the time such speed probably appeared commendable, with the benefit of hindsight it looks more like a rush to judgment. The report is very short and displays a number of internal inconsistencies [8.6].
4. Lord Widgery voluntarily and unnecessarily restricted his own terms of reference. He also failed to take proper testimony from the wounded survivors of Bloody Sunday [8.5].
5. Furthermore, he failed to call many crucial eyewitnesses and properly to interpret photographic evidence. Perhaps as a result of these inadequacies, he did not succeed in resolving completely conflicting evidence. [8.7]
6. "Lord" Widgery's handling of the forensic evidence was inept. He relied heavily on the evidence of a forensic scientist who had not seen the bodies of the deceased and who had no information concerning the manner of their deaths. "Lord" Widgery concluded from this evidence that firearms residue found on swabs taken from the bodies and clothing of some of the deceased showed that they themselves had been firing guns or had been in close contact with others who had done so. He dismissed the very obvious possibility that this residue had arisen from secondary contamination. [8.8]
7. Despite his considerable judicial experience, Lord Widgery misinterpreted domestic law on the use of lethal force. He also completely ignored relevant international law. [8.9]
8. The Widgery Inquiry came to conclusions which were not sustained by the evidence available to him [8.10]. By his own findings, he concluded that
9. • if the army had maintained a "low key" approach and not attempted a large scale arrest operation, the day might have passed off ithout serious incident;
   • the hazard in the army's operation to civilians may have been underestimated;
   • the soldiers fired without receiving any order to do so and had to decide individually whether to open fire;
   • the soldiers were trained to shoot to kill and their training made them aggressive and decisive;
   • some of the firing by soldiers bordered on the reckless;
   • none of the deceased or wounded was proved to have been shot while handling a firearm or bomb;
   • none of the soldiers was injured.
10. Such a list of findings ought to have led, at the very least, to searching investigation of whether the use of lethal force was justified at all, and, if it was, whether its use was proportionate to the situation [8.10.1]. Nevertheless, Widgery went on to find that no-one would have died if the march had not been held, and that the way in which the march was policed was "fully justified" [8.10.4]. He also found that the soldiers were at least as fired upon as firing [8.10.7], a conclusion which is simply not borne out by the evidence.

Conclusions

In our submission, the events which took place on Bloody Sunday amounted to the summary and arbitrary execution of unarmed civilians who were the victims of soldiers acting under the military and political command of the United Kingdom government.

1. the decision to use the Paras was made well in advance of the demonstration and the plan for policing the demonstration, which was opposed by the local police chief, always encompassed the possibility of risk to the life of the demonstrators and others in the vicinity;
2. the choice of the Paras to conduct the arrest operation was both deliberate and reckless. The training of the Paras was completely inappropriate for such a task and their deployment made the risk of casualties inevitable;
3. the overwhelming evidence of eyewitnesses and from press photographs, supported by Widgery's own findings, is that none of the deceased or injured was armed with any weapon;
4. although individual soldiers may have genuinely believed themselves to be under fire, there is no evidence that they came under the sustained firing or hail of nail-, petrol- and acid-bombs which they claimed to have endured.
5. No soldier was injured on Bloody Sunday, and no weapons other than the nail bombs which were obviously planted on the body of Gerald Donaghy were recovered;
6. the United Kingdom government disseminated disinformation about the deceased after the event;

Widgery's inquiry into the event was seriously flawed and did not establish the full truth.

Major Hubert O'Neill, the Coroner who held the much-delayed inquest on those who died on Bloody Sunday issued a statement on 21 August 1973 in which he said:

[Irish Times, 22 August 1972]

The relatives of those who died on Bloody Sunday are seeking a new inquiry into their deaths and the prosecution of those responsible.

Bloody Sunday